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ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT RIGHTS AND
DUTIES IN KENTUCKY AND THE RESTATEMENT
We are informed in the Restatement 1 that a right may be
assigned unless (a) such assignment would cause a material
variation in the duty of the obligor, or increase materially the
burden or risk imposed upon him or impair his chances of obtain-
ing a return performance, or (b) the assignment is forbidden by
statute or by the policy of the common law, or (c) is prohibited
by the contract creating the right. It will be recalled that at
the earlier common law, contractual rights were not assignable.
In 1798 a statute was passed in Kentucky 2 dealing with assign-
ment, providing that all bonds, bills or notes for money or
property shall be assignable so as to vest the right of action in
the assignee and making provision for defenses. It seems to
have been the view of the court that in all cases coming under
the statute the legal title to the writing passed, but where there
was an assignment of writings that did not come within the stat-
ute, only an equitable title passed.3
Many of the statements found in the Restatement are not
applicable in Kentucky because of this early statute which
'Sec. 151.2The earlier statute passed in 1796 was very broad and made all
writings assignable (1 Litt. Dig., p. 509); in 1798 the following statute
was enacted: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that all bonds,
bills, and promissory notes, whether for money or property, shall be
assignable, and it shall and may be lawful for the assignee of any such
bond, bill or note, to sue for the same in the same manner the original
obligee or payee might or could do. Provided always, that the defend-
ant shall be allowed all discounts, under the rules and regulations pre-
scribed by law, he can prove at the trial, either against the plaintiff
or the original obligee or payee, before notice of the assignment. And
provided always, that nothing in this act contained, shall be so con-
strued as to change the nature of the defense, either in law or equity,
that any defendant or defendants may have against an assignee or as-
sign'ees, or the original assignor or assignors." (2 Litt. Dig., p. 75,
See. 1). See also Morehead and Brown (1834), pp. 150, 151. With sub-
stantially no change this statute appears as Section 471 of Carroll's
Kentucky Statutes (1922). For earlier legislation in Virginia see 1
Hening's Statutes at Large, p. 314, Act XI (1644); 2 ib., p. 87, Sec. VII
(1748); 10 ib. 60 (1779) making warrants and certificates of survey
assignable; 10 ib. 467, Sec. III (1781) making loan office certificates
assignable. Tort actions were not assignable. See Francis v. Burnett,
-7 Ky. Law Rep. 715 (1886); Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Tauabeee, 142 Ky.
783, 785 (1913).8Anderso t v. Bradford, 5 J. J. Marsh. (28 Ky.) 69 (1830) ; Yantes
v. ESmith, 12 B. Mon. (51 Ky.) 395 (1851); Forepaugh v. A3pold, 17 B.
Mon. (56 Ky.) 625 (1856); Taylor's Exrs. v. Gibbs, 3 B. Mon. (42 Ky.)
316 (1843); Miller v. Field, 3 A. K. Marsh. (10 Ky.) 104 (1820).
,ASSIGNMENT
strictly limits assignments at law. However, so-called equitable
assignments have been so far countenanced here that the Re-
statement becomes a helpful guide.
1. ASSIGABLE CONTRACTS UNDER STATUTE.
The foliowing are among the cases that were held to come
within the statute so that the assignee could sue in his own name:
4an obligation evidenced by a copy of the record of town trustees
signed by the clerk and the treasurer directing the latter to pay
a sum of money to a creditor of the town.4 In Snelhing v. Boyd 5
a covenant for the sale and conveyance of land was held to be
assignable, but as the covenantees had a joint interest it was nec-
essary for all to join in the assignment in order to pass the legal
title to the covenant. So is a lease assignable by the lessor if it
contains only a promise for the payment of money, but not if it
imposes other obligations on the lessee.6 So also, where the
holder of a certificate of stock has been given a guaranty against
loss and transfers the certificate and the guaranty, the assignee
may recover on the guaranty in his own name ;7 and the assignee
may recover from the maker of a contract who promised to pay
a certain sum of money in notes.8 Under the declaratory judg-
ment act it was held that "all the proceeds" of a tobacco crop
were assignable and included the common stock issued in a
warehousing corporation and everything that was, or might be
due from tobacco or a sale of it. 9 Contrary to the usual view,
it has been held in Kentucky prior to the Negotiable Instruments
Law that a check amounts to an assignment of the fund on which
it is drawn 10
4 Carnegie V. Trustees, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 431 (1891).
'5 T. B. Mon. (21 Ky.) 172 (1827); Cfonn v. Jones, Rar. (3 Ky.)
9 (1805); Neyfong v. Wells, liar. 571 (Ky. 1808). So is an option con-
tract assignable. See Ghesbroughz v. Vizard Inv. Co., 156 Ky. 149 (1913).
See Restatement, Sec. 155. But in Bowman v. Frowman, 2 Bibb. (5 Ky.)
233 (1810), and Craig v. Miller, 3 Bibb (6 Ky.) 440 (1814), it was held
that agreements for the transfer of land do not come within the statute.
cf. Madeiras v. Catlett, 7 T. B. Mon. 475 (1828).
6Helburn v. Mofford, 7 Bush. (70 Ky.) 169 (1870). See also Lewis
v. Ringo, 3 A. K. Marsh. 247 (1821). But see Haynes v. Aaams, 3 A.
K. Marsh. 149 (1820).
?Rogers v. Harvey, 143 Ky. 88, 136 S. W. 128 (1911).
'S'irott v. Tandy, 3 Dana (33 Ky.) 142 (1835). Cf. Bledsoe v.
Fisher, 2 Bibb. 471 (1831).
'Carpenter v. Dummit, 221 Ky. 67, 297 S. W. 164 (1927).
"Taylor v. Taylor, 78 Ky. 470, (1880); Merchants 2Yati. Bank v.
Robinson, 97 Ky. 552 (1895); cf. Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10
Wall, 152 (U. S. 1869); Van Buskirk v. State Bank, 35 Col. 142 (1905)
contra. See also infra notes 109-111. On an order as an assignment
see Restatement, Sec. 163.
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Sometimes the court decides the question of assignability on
general principles and fails to comment, save indirectly; upon
the bearing of the statute. So in Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Taid-
bee 11 the court held that where a lease had been assigned the
assignee could sue for the breach of the lease contract though the
action was not on a "bond, bill or note for money or property."
In Nhndtz v. Johnson's Admr.12 a covenant between the
parties whereby A was to furnish B with "six successive crops
of hemp of his own raising embracing all the hemp he can raise
upon not less than one hundred nor more than one hundred and
sixty acres of land each year" etc., was held not to be per-
formable by the administrator of A. The court was of the opin-
ion that a delegation of performance was not possible, be-
cause parties specifically contracted for performance by the
obligor.13 No reference was made to the assignments statute.
2. CONTRACTS HELD NOT AssIGlANBm UNDER THE STATUTE.
On the other hand, various contracts are not assignable under
the statute, and while generally enforceable if necessary in
equity, at law the action must be brought in the name of the
assignor, or else he must be joined as a party in equity. 14 There
are many illustrations of cases which are beyond the purview ef
the assignment statute, and the common law rules apply in spite
n152 Ky. 783 (1913). Here the lessee of a mill was to make certain
attachments to it and pay his rent iii this way. After using the mill
for a sufficient time to pay himself for the attachments he abandoned
the premises and removed the attachments. It was held that the as-
signee of the lessor could sue the lessee for breach of contract, since
the assignee could perform as well as the lessor the obligations under
the lease. "It is well settled that a written contract is generally as-
signable unless forbidden by public policy, or the contract' itself, or its
provisioils are such as to show one of the parties reposes a personal
confidence in the other which he would have been unwilling to repose
in any other person." See Restatement, Sec. 152 (1). See Carrolrs
Kentucky Statutes (1909), Sec. 474.
25 B. Mon. 497 (1845).
-See Restatement, Sec. 160 (3), (c).
"Hickcs v. Doty, 4 Bush (67 Ky.) 420 (1868); Dougherty v. Maple,
4 Bibb 557 (Ky. 1817). See Pond Creek CoaZ Co. v Lester, 171 Ky. 811
(1916). (Coupon books giving right to trade at obligor's store were
assignable in equity. By Kentucky Constitution See. 244 and by Statute
See. 2738 employers of ten or more must pay in money, and if coupon
letters of credit are issued they must be redeemed In cash when pre-
sented after the wages are due. A stipulation for payment in mer.
chandise only and against assignment was invalid.) See Restatement
Sec. 152 (1).
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of the real party in interest statute. 15 Thus a covenant both to
pay rent and to make improvenients is not within the statute ;16
nor a contract to pay the hire of a slave and to clothe him;17
nor a promise to pay money and to perform certain labor;18
nor replevin bonds ;19 nor judgments ;20 nor the right to reclaim
a sum of money paid as usury ;21 nor the right arising from a
covenant to collect money and pay it over ;22 nor the right to sue
an assignor for breach of his implied warranty.23 The assign-
ment of the note of an insolvent agent who fraudulently failed
to disclose his principal carries with it the right to sue the prin-
cipal also, but the assignment is equitable only.24 A master can-
not assign his claim against his apprentice for service ;25 nor can
the duty to collect money and pay it over be assigned; 26 nor
5 The so-called "real party in interest" statute took effect in Ken-
tucky in 1851. See Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky (1850), p. 116 Tit. III, Secs. 57, 58, which read as follows:
Sec. 57. "Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest except as provided in Sec. 60."
Sec. 58. "In the case of an assignment of a thing in action, the
action of the assignee is,without prejudice to any discount, set-off or
defense now allowed. And when the assignment is not authorized by
statute the assignor must be a party, as plaintiff or defendant. This
section does not apply to bills of exchange, nor to promissory notes
placed upon the footing of bills of exchange, nor to common orders
or checks."
It thus appears that this is not a "real party in interest" statute
In any significant sense. See for Kentucky practice, Pomeroy on Code
Remedies (fifth ed. 1929), Sec. 73, and cases cited; and ib. see. 149,
page 245. See also 1 Newman's Pleading, Practice and Forms (third
ed. 2 vol. 1916), See. 122b.
"Hick.s v. Doty, supra n. 14. Some of the cases, it will be noted
antedate "thb real party in interest" statute.
"Boyd V. Rurnsey, 5 J. J. Marsh. (28 Ky.) 42 (1830).
'Marcum v. Hereford, 8 Dana (38 Ky.) 1 (1839); see also Henry
v. Hughes, v. J. J. Marsh, (24 Ky.) 453 (1829); Halbert v. Deering, 4
Litt. 9 (1823).
'Anderson v. Bradford, supra n. 3; Yantes v. Smith, supra n. 3.
* rawford v. Duncan, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 134 (1885); Millar v. Field,
supra n. 3; Anderson v. Bradford, supra n. 3; Robinson v. White, 4
Litt. 237 (1823); Elliott v. Waring, 5 T. B. Mon. 238 (1827).
"Breckinridge v. Churchill, 3 J. J. Marsh, (26 Ky.) 11 (1829).
2White v. Buck, 7 B. Mon. (46 Ky.) 546 (1847).
'Mardis v. Tyler, 10 B. Mon. (49 Ky.) 376 (1850).
21 Wilson v. Thompson, 1 Mete. (58 Ky.) 123 (1858). The tort claim
against the agent was not assigned by implication. Cf. Yankton Col-
lege v. Smith, 226 N. W. 584 (S. D. 1929), and case note in 43 Harv.
Law Rev. 316 (1929).
"Hudnet v. Bullock, 3 A. K. Marsh, (10 Ky.) 299 (1821). See Re-
statement, Sec. 152.
"Force's Admr. v. Thomason, 2 Litt. (12 Ky.) 166 (1822); Jones
v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 357 (1822). See Restatement, Sec. 152.
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debts due on account;27 nor debts due by parol;23 nor future
earnings under an existing contract;29 nor claims for fees due
a sheriff;3 0 nor the "made net earnings" of stock in a corpora-
tion.31  Naturally, the claim of an obligee against one only of
two joint obligors is not assignable.3 2 Nor can two joint obligees
transfer a bond, one to one assignee and the other to another, so
as to bring the assignment within the statute.33 The assignment
of a right to have a partition deed corrected passes an equitable
interest, and the statute does not apply.3 4
Salaries and fees of various municipal officers have been
held not to be assignable in Kentucky, such assignments being
regarded as in conflict with public policy.3 5 The same principle
applies to a pension claim.3
Contracts involving personal liability or a relationship of
personal confidence, or those which call for the skill or experi-
ence of one of the parties, are not assignable even in equity by
the promisee though he may waive, the right to personal per-
formance.
3 7
3. DEF- SES OF THE OBLIGOR AND CLA s OF FoRa=xR OWNERS.
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act became a law in
Kentucky in March 1904. It appears that notes for the payment
of money were not negotiable prior to that time, at least in the
2 Forepaugh v. Appold, supra n. 3; Graham v. Tilyord, 1 Mete. (58
Ky.) 112 (1858) (only an equitable interest passes).
"Jarman v. Howard, 3 A. K. Marsh. (10 Ky.) 383 (1820).
"Boone v. Connelly, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 190 (1890). Cf. Levi v. Loven-
hart, infra n. 56. See Restatement, Sec. 154 (1).
"0Jones v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt (12 Ky.) 357 (1822).
U Petty v. Hagan, 205 Ky. 264, 265 S. W. 787 (1924). But a divi-
dend is assignable before it is declared.
3 Lyon v. Lyon, 4 Bibb. (7 Ky.) 438 (1816).
8Snelling v. Boyd, supra n. 5.
"ATtchell v. Owings, 3 A. K. Marsh. (10 Ky.) 312 (1821).
mField v. Chip7ey, 79 Ky. 260 (1881); Dickinson v. Johnson, 110
Ky. 236, 61 S. W. 261 (1901); Schmitt v. Dooling, 145 Ky. 240, 140 S. W.
107 (1911); Holt v. Thurman, 111 Ky. 84, 63 S. W. 280 (1901); Francis
v. Burnett, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 715 (1886); Coburn v. Curren&, 64 Ky. 242
(1866). These cases overrule Manly v. Ritzer, 91 Ky. 596 (1891);
Cf. Webb v. McCauley, 4 Bush (67 Ky.) 8 (1868), See Restate-
ment, Sec. 151 (b). For assignment of wages by a janitor employed
by a schoolboard see Oberdorfer v. Louisville School Board, 120 Ky.
112 (1905).
Trimble v. Ford, 5 Dana (35 Ky.) 517 (1837).
"
T Hoag v. Reichert, 142 Ky. 298, 134 S. W. 191 (1911); see also
Pulaski Stave Co. v. Miller's Creek Lumber Co., 138 Ky. 372, 128
S. W. 96 (1910). See Restatement, Sees. 160, 161, 164.
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sense that equities of defense were cut off when such instru-
ments had come into the hands of bona fide purchasers for
value. 38
Prather v. Weisiger5s was decided in 1873. In that case
the court held that the purchaser of such a note when indorsed
was not protected from the defenses of the maker, and declared
that Kentucky had not followed the Statute of Anne making
such instruments negotiable. The only general statutes having
any bearing upon the transfer of sieh instruments were the as-
signment statute already recited 40 and the act of 1865 making
notes payable at and discounted by a bank, negotiable. Again, in
the year 1900, the court, in Richie v. Cralle 41 declared that the
"In 1865 the following statute was enacted: "Promissory notes,
payable to any person or persons, or to a corporation and payable and
negotiable at any bank incorporated under any law of this Common-
wealth, or organized in this Commonwealth under any law of the
United States, which shall be indorsed to, and discounted by, the bank
at which the same is payable, or by any other of the banks in this
Commonwealth, as nbove specified, shall be and they are hereby placed
on the same footing as foreign bills of exchange." See Bullock and
Johnson's General Statutes of Kentucky (1873), Chap. 22, Sec. 21, P.
252; Bullitt and Feland's General Statutes of Kentucky (1881), Chap.
22, Sec. 21, p. 252; Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (1922), Sec. 483, re-
pealed by the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1904.
Miller in his treatise on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Ken-
tucky, page 210, Indicates that there were certain special provisions
in the charters of various banks adopting the provisions bf the Statute
of 4th Anne C. 9 which he says were supplanted by the Act of 1865.
He does not cite the Acts where such provisions were made. Certainly
the Act of 1865 is far from adopting that statute. Such a statute seems
to have been unknown to Judge Prior, who wrote the opinion. in Prather
v. Weisiger, infra n. 39. An interesting act was passed in 1817 for
the purpose of preventing the circulation of private notes. See 1 More-
head and Brown Statute Law of Kentucky, p. 236. For an act in 1841
concerning the negotiability of "bills, drafts and checks" see Acts of
1841, p. 54, chap. 239.
310 Bush (73 Ky.) 117 (1873); see also Drake v. Johnson, Har.
226 (1808). See Miller, "Kentucky Negotiable Instruments Law"
(1915), p. 19.
4 0 Supra n. 2.
"108 Ky. 483, 56 5. W. 963 (1900). For bill of exchange case see
Finnen v. Nesbit, 16 B. Mon. (55 Ky.) 351 (1855), where purchaser was
not one for value, and see also EBy v. Horine, 5 Dana 398 (1837). See
accord Chiles v. Corn, 3 A. K. Marsh, (10 Ky.) 230 (1821) gchooling
v. M'Gee, 1 T. B. Mon. 233 (1824); Porter v. Breckinridge, Har. 2,
(1805); Markham v. Todd, 2 J. J. Marsh, 364 (1829). Hopper v. Holtz-
clau, 2 Ky. Op. 665 (1868), holds that where a note is assigned after
maturity it is subject to all defenses it would have been subject to in
the hands of the original payee. This seems to imply the possibility
that if the iote had been assigned before maturity a different result
would follow. The opinion Is very brief and there is no description
of the instrument other than that it is called a negotiable note. Per-
haps it comes within the statute of 1865.
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assignment statute did not make promises coming within it nego-
tiable so as to cut off defenses, and further says that the assign-
ment of contracts with the exception of bills of exchange does not
cut off defenses of the maker, though the instrument is in the
hands of a purchaser for value without notice. In the case of a
bill of exchange 42 it was held that the assignee of the payee in in-
solvency proceedings must permit a set-off to the amount of the
maker's deposit in the bank because the assignee was not 'a pur-
chaser for value.
If the maker pays the assignor without notice of the as-
signment, he is protected ;43 but not so if he pays the assignor
after such notice.44 So usury has been held to be a good partial
defense to an action on a note by the assignee. 45 The fact that
a note was given for a gaming debt was also held to be a real de-
fense against the assignee long before the Uniform Negotiable In-
struments Law was thought of.45 The power to assert a real
defense to a negotiable note given for a gaming debt may be
lost by conduct which works an estoppel,47 but in an early case
it was held that the maker could defend against the assignee of
such a note even though the note was accompanied by a declara-
tion that the debt was just and there was no defense to it. 4 8 So
where a lightning rod agent obtained not only a note by fraud,
but also a similar recommendation for the note by fraud, the
4Finnefl v. Nesbit, supra n. 41; see Ely v. Horine, supra n. 41.
1 Gibson v. Pew, 3 J. J. Marsh. (26 Ky.) 222 (1830); Clark v. Boyd,
6 T. B. Mon. 293 (1827).
41Johnson v. Lewis, 1 A. K. Marsh. 401 (1818); Mar, v. Hanna,
7 J. J. Marsh. 642 (1832), holding that a release by the assignor after
notice to the obligor of the assignment is ineffective even at law. This
case also holds that if the assignor release after the assignment, and
the court dismisses the action brought by the assignee in the name
of the assignor the former may have a writ of error because of his
interest in the action. See Weis& v. Mandeville, 1 Wheaton 233 (U. S.
1816).
41 Chambers v. Keene, 1 Mete. (58 Ky.) 289 (1858); True v. Trip-
lett, 4 Metc. (61 Ky.) 56 (1862).
41 Thompson v. Moore, 4 T. B. Mon. (20 Ky.) 79 (1826). A statute
making gaming contracts void was passed in Kentucky in 1798. See
2 Morehead and Brown (1834), pp. 751-755. After the Negotiable In-
strument Law was enacted a gaming consideartion was held to be a
real defense. The statute cited avoiding gaming contracts was Sec.
1955, passed in 1903. But this statute is substantially the same as the
earlier one. See also Bohon v. Broun, 101 Ky. 354 (1897); Alexan-er
v. Hazelrigg, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1212 (1906).
'
THolzbog v. Barow, 156 Ky. 161 (1913).
"P ace v. Martin, 2 Duv. (63 Ky.) 522 (1866).
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maker was allowed to assert his defense against the assignee.49
But the substantial equivalent of negotiability (before the en-
actment of the Negotiable Instruments Law) was reached where
the note, though obtained by fraud of the suave lightning rod
agent, was accompanied by a recommendation of the note by
the maker to the effect that the note was valid and there was
no defense to it.50
(a) Equities of defense.
It is to be understood that defenses in the note cases prior
to the Negotiable Instruments Law are indicative of those gen-
erally applicable to other contracts. So the assignee of a non-
negotiable chose in action is subject to the equities of defense the
obligor may have at the time of notice of the assignment. 51 There
are two types of relief which the obligor may seek when sued
by the assignee. He may wish to assert that the whole obligation
or a part thereof is invalid, or he may admit it is valid but may
seek a set-off against it. Some cases of the first class have al-
ready been noted. Other cases may be found as follows: fraud
on the part of the assignor in obtaining the note ;52 the running
of the Statute of Limitations in favor 6f a surety although as-
signee did not know that defendant was a surety when he took
an assignment of the note. 53 A promise to the assignee to pay
after the assignment has taken place does not preclude the
obligor from asserting equities that already existed but were un-
known to him when he made the promise.5 4  In one case the
judgment creditor garnished the debtor of the judgment debtor,
and the garnishee did not make an appearance. Judgment was
taken against the garnishee followed by levy of execution. Later
the garnishee asked that judgment be vacted on the ground that
notes representing his obligation to the judgment debtor had
been assigned by the judgment debtor, and that he did not know
49Hill v. Thixton, 94 Ky. 96 (1893).
"Crabtree v. Atchison, 93 Ky. 338 (1892). Cf. Wells v. Lewis 4
Mete. 269 (Ky. 1863); Morrison v. Beckwith, 4 T. B. Mon. 73 (1826);
Wooldridge v. Cates, 2 J. J. Marsh. 221 (1829); McBrayer v. Collins,
18 B. Mon. (57 Ky.) 833 (1857). See also Short v. Jaccson, Sneed (2
Ky.) 192 (1802) (benefit of estoppel accrues to subsequent assignees).
Restatement Sec. 167 (1).
0 Chiles v. Corn, 3 A. K. Marsh. (10 Ky.) 230 (1821). Cf. Pace
v. Martin, supra n. 48, and Hill v. Thixton, supra n. 49. See also Chen-
ault v. Bush, 84 Ky. 528 (1886).
"Day v. Billingsly, 3 Bush (66 Ky.) 157 (1867).
" Clay v. McClanahan, 5 B. Mon. (44 Ky.) 241 (1844).
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this fact when he failed to appear in the garnishment proceed-
ings and permitted judgment to issue by default. It was held
that this is not sufficient ground for vacating the judgment, in-
asmuch as he will have a valid defense to the notes after he has
paid the judgment in garnishment proceedings. Of course the
assignee must rely upon the instrument assigned, and cannot
recover upon the original consideration. 5 5
In Levi v. Lovenhart, A being in the employ of B, assigned
to his creditor, C, a certain portion of his weekly wages to which
assignment B assented and under which he made certain pay-
ments. Later A received a discharge in bankruptcy whereupon,
on the refusal of B to make further payments, C sued B. It
seems that the claim of C on an implied contract of A not. to
revoke the assignment is not provable in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, and so should not be discharged. The court held, however,
that the order to pay was valid only so long as the debt remained
unsatisfied. 57
(b) Set-offs.
As to set-offs, the obligor, when sued by the assignee, may
set-off any contract claim he had against the assignor which had
matured at the time of notice.5s But a note not matured
at the time of suit, cannot be set-off either under the stat-
ute or in equity, even though the assignor is then insol-
vent.5 9 In Chenault v. Bush,"0 A, B, and C had been part-
ners, C having a one-half interest. They borrowed money
to carry on their business. A and B had been partners in
a different business, and as such had sold certain chattels to
C for which C gave his notes. A and B being insolvent, assigned
Cason v. Wallace, 4 Bush (67 Ky.) 388 (1868).
138 Ky. 133 (1910).
See 1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 414; Restatement See. 167 (1).
' See set-off Statute of 1796 in 2 Morehead and Brown, p. 1448.
Cf. Caroll's Kentucky Civil Code (7th ed. 1927), Secs. 95, 96. See Re-
statement Sec. 167 (2) and (3); M2Nlett v. Swift, infra n. 116; Hender-
son Natl. Bank v. Lagow, 3 K. L. R. 173 (1878). See 1 Williston on
Contracts, Sec. 434.
Graham v. Tilford, 1 Mete. (58 Ky.) 112 (1858); Merchants Natl.
Bank v. Robinson, supra n. 10; Walker v. McKay, infra. n. 61. Case
holds, however, that an assignment may be taken by the obligor purely
for the purpose of set-off against the obligee and as such is good
against the obligee's assignee even though the obligor must account
to his assignor for the proceeds.
c Supra n. 52. This case illustrates both on original defense and
a right of set-off.
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their property to X, and X sued C on his notes at a time when the
obligation of the three for borrowed money had not yet become
due. C, however, paid off this obligation before it became due,
and asserted the right to set-off his claim for contribution against
these notes given by him for the chattels of A and B. His right
of set-off was recognized and the case was distinguished from
Walker v. McKay.61 A somewhat similar problem arises in the
case of sales of land. 'Thus in Taylor v. Ford 34 A sold a bond
for the conveyance of certain land to B, who gave his note in
part payment therefor, and became insolvent after again assign-
ing the bond. A sold B's note to C, but had to redeem it. A then
asked to have his vendor's lien re-asserted. The court seems to
have regarded the giving of a bond as equivalent to the convey-
ance of the land. Hence,- though a vendor may have an equi-
table lien until the vendee conveys away, he cannot assert such
an equitable lien against a purchaser for value of the land or
bond. Presumably the vendor must execute a conveyance ac-
cording to his bond and could make no defense. Perhaps this
claim for a lien more nearly resembles a defense than a set-off.
If, however, the sub-purchaser has not paid his vendor fully, the
original vendor may assert a lien against such sub-purchaser to
the extent that his own claim equals the debt of the sub-pur-
chaser.63
In Harrison v. Burgess 64 the situation is complicated, but
for our purpose the following facts will suffice. A and R were
sureties for C on a note. C held a note against A. C assigned his
A note to R to indemnify R against loss on his suretyship obliga-
tion. At the same time R executed a receipt and a promise to
restore to C the A note so soon as he (R) should be released. This
acknowledgment of collateral was assigned by C to plaintiff,
who gave notice to R. A, however, having been surety for C
in still another transaction, made a settlement of it and there-
after obtained from C an order on R for the surrender of his
(A's) note, and it was surrendered to him. Thereafter plain-
tiff sued C, R and A. It was held that A received possession
"2 Mete. (59 Ky.) 294 (1859).
21 Bush (64 Ky.) 44 (1866). See also Anderson v. Wefls, 6 B.
Mon. (45 Ky.) 540 (1846), and McBrayer v. Coflins, supra n. 50.
"Hunt v. Brand, 5 B. Mon. (44 Ky.) 562 (1845).
5 T. B. Mon (21 Ky.) 417 (1827); see Restatement See. 155 for
conditional right.
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of the acknowledgment of R without notice of the claim of plain-
tiff, and was liable only for such balance as he might still owe
A on the note, and his right of set-off was vindicated though pos-
session of the R acknowledgment did not pass legal title to the
note. It seems clear that he would have had the right of set-
off, however, even if he had never obtained possession of R's
written statement and promise. In Harlan v. Lurmsden 65 it was
held that when an action is brought on behalf of the Common-
wealth against a deputy sheriff for taxes collected by him and
not paid over, he may set-off a claim which he has against the
sheriff for the sum he had been obligated to pay as surety for the
sheriff.
Of course, where the assignee brings an action and the
obligor sets off another claim against the assignor, if the assignee
withdraws his action the suit cannot go on as to the set-off or
counter-claim, since the proper defendant is not before the
court.6 6
(c) Latent Equities.
The Kentucky cases so far as they have been examined,
seem to agree with the Restatement 67 that prior equities of
ownership or latent equities are cut off by the sale to an assignee
for value and without notice.68 It seems to follow that the
obligor cannot resist payment because of lack of interest in the
assignee, whether consideration has been paid by him or'not, 09
nor where the token or writing was delivered without considera-
tion. 70
4. LiABILITy OF THE ASSIGNOR.
It has already been observed that notes for money or prop-
erty were assignable under the statute of 1798 and that there
651 Duv. (62 Ky.) 86 (1863).
Brown v. Young, 4 Ky. Op. 701 (1872).
' Section 174.
'Newby v. Hall, 2 Mete. 530 (Ky. 1859); Taylor v. Ford, supra n.
64; White v. Prentiss, 3 T. B. Mon. 449 (1826). It is not always easy
to reconcile this rule with the rule of priority of assignments discussed
infra.
"'Henderson Natl. Bank V. Lagow, 10 Ky. Op. 103 (1878); Wil-
liamson 1. Yager, 91 Ky. 282 (1891); 34 A. S. R. 184 note.
"Pawlings v. Speed, Litt Sel. Cas. 77 (Ky. 1808); Restatement
See. 150 (2).
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was no general acceptance of the doctrine of negotiability of
promissory notes for cutting off defenses until the enactment of
the Negotiable Instruments Law in 1904. This phenomenon is
accompanied by another, namely, the extreme extent of the li-
ability of the assignor to the assignee.71 It is sometimes said that
the seller of a chose in action assumes the same liability to the
buyer as does the seller of a chattel.72 But it is evident that if the
seller of a chose warrants the solvency of the obligor at the time
of the assignment, his liability is much greater than that of the
seller of a chattel. In Kentucky the rule seems clearly to be that
the assignor promises to repay the assignee the consideration
paid by the latter 73 if the latter uses due diligence in collecting
from the obligor and fails.74 That is to say, the seller warrants
the solvency of the obligor at the time of the assignment.75 This
rule is acknowledged not to be the common law rule, but rises
from the Statute on Assignments. 76 This extreme liability is ap-
plicable to assignments under the statute and not to other as-
signments usually called equitable assignments. 77
But the assignee must use due diligence in seeking to recover
from the obligor.78 What is due diligence? If both the Quar-
71 See Restatement Sec. 175; 1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 445. The
assignor's implied warrantees are substantially the same as those of
a qualified indorser.
"Crawford v. Duncan, supra n. 20; Gilmore v. Green, 14 Bush (77
Ky.) 772 (1879).
Buckner v. Curry, 1 Bibb. 477 (1809); but Cf. Butler v. Suddeth,
6 T. B. Mon. (22 Ky.) 541 (1828).
74Smallwood v. Woods, 1 Bibb (4 Ky.) 542 (1809). For a different
measure of damages, see McKinney v. McConnell, 1 Bibb, 239 (1808);
,Stafford v. Steele, 7 J. J. Marsh, 342 (1832). See Morehead v. Prather,
1 A. K. Marsh. 542 (1819); Spratt v. McKinney, I Bibb. 595 (1809);
Davis v. Harrison, 2 J. J. Marsh. 189 (1829). See also Stapp v. Ander-
son, 1 A. K. Marsh. 535 (1819); Clay v. Johnson, 6 T. B. Mon. 644 (Ky.
1828); Crews v. Dabney, I Litt. 278 (1822). See additional cases cited
from Kentucky in 5 Corpus Juris, Assignments, Sec. 158, p. 969, note
59.
";Andirson v. Bradford, supra n. 3. Cf. Restatement Sec. 175 (2).
"Crawford v. Duncan, supra n. 20; Campbell v. Hopson, 1 A. K.
March, 228 (1818).
"Smallwood v. Woods, supra n. 74. This statute is borrowed from
Virginia. The court cites Mackie v. Davis, 2 Wash. 219 (Va. 1796),
and an earlier Kentucky case, Boals v. McConnell, Sneed (2 Ky.) 130(1802). Cf. as to the liability of the assignor of a judgment, Robinson
v. White, 4 Litt. 237 (1823); as to bond for conveyance of land see
Moredock v. Rawlings, 3 T. B. Mon. 73 (1825); Bedal v. Stith, 3 T. B.
Mon. 290 (1826); Stafford. v. Steele, supra n. 74.
1"Bonta v. Curry, 3 Bush (66 Ky.) 678 (1868); Coleman v. Tully,
7 Bush (70 Ky.) 72 (1869); Green v. Cummnins, 14 Bush (77 Ky.) 174
(1878); Hurst v. Chambers, 12 Bush (75 Ky.) 155 (1876).
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terly Court and the District Court have jurisdiction, suit must
be brought in that court which fist holds a term after the debt is
due.79 A delay of two terms does not show due diligence. In
fact, if the obligor lives a long way from the court house and in
the country, it is not sufficient diligence to put process in the
hands of the sheriff which must be served within a period of four
or five days.8 1 It is not sufficient to sue the obligor in a county
where he does not reside, and after judgment to wait four months
before levying execution.82 In fact, to delay without excuse two
months to levy execution does not show dne diligence.8 3 If a
foreign corporation is the obligor it should be sued at its place
of business instead of in a state where it has no assets. There
must then be a levy of execution and a return by the sheriff midla
bona to warrant recovery from the assignor.84  Mere insolvency
of the obligor is held not a breach of the assignor's warranty,
and there must be a judgment and return nul/a bona, 5 in order
to fastern liability on the assignor; and thereafter he must be
sued within the period of the Statute of Limitations.8" All legal
and equitable remedies available against the obligor must be ex-
hausted in order to hold the assignor on his warranty.8 7 . Thus
due diligence requires that the assignee demand bail where bail
is demandable, and obtain a capias ad satisfaciendum or a return
non est inventus, and then proceed against the surety on the bail
bond88 A stay of execution by plaintiff after levy discharges the
assignor.89
1R0ogers v. McHenry, 5 Ky. Op. 255 (1871) ; Cf. Brinker v. Perry,
5 Litt. 194 (1824); Oldham v. Bengan, 2 Litt. 132 (1822); Markley v.
Withers, 4 T. B. Mon. 14 (1826); Thomas v. Taylor, 2 J. J. Marsh. 217
(1829). As to the form of the return, see Hall v. Roberts, 3 J. . Marsh.
323 (1830).
Rives v. Brown, 81 Ky. 636 (1884). See also Trimble v. Webb,
1 T. B. Mon. 100 (1824).
"Bays v. Patton, 8 B. Mon. (47 Ky.) 228 (1847).
2Burk v. Morrison, 8 B. Mon. (47 Ky.) 131 (1847). See also
Hogan v. Vance, 2 Bibb. 34 (1810).
8Chambers v. Keene, supra n. 45.
"Citizens National Bank v. H'ubbert, 97 Ky. 768, 31 S. W. 735(1895).
= Francis v. Gant, 80 Ky. 190 (1882).
Gilmore v. Green, supra n. 72.
Burk v. Morrison, supra n. 82; Chambers v. Keene, supra n. 45.
Smallwood v. Woods, supra n. 74. See Young v. Cosby, 3 Bibb
227 (Ky. 1813); Smith v. Bacon, 3 J. J. Marsh. 312 (1830).
"McGinnis v. Burton, 3 Bibb 6 (1813). See ,Tohnson v. Lewis,
1 Dana 182 (1833), for recovery by assignee against an officer, for mis-
conduct, and its beaiing on the liability of the assignor.
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Even a married woman obligor must be sued before the as-
signor is liable, since she might not plead her coverture.90 A re-
mote assigiior is not directly liable to the remote assignee, 91 but
the latter may sue him in the name of his assignor.92 An assign-
ment of a claim protected by a mechanic's lien carries the lien
with it to the assignee.93
The assignor, even he who assigns without recourse war-
rants that the claim is a subsisting obligation, but if he demands
the privilege he is entitled to control the action against the obli-
-gor. Otherwise he is excused from liability even though judg-
ment may be rendered in favor of the obligor when sued by the
assignee. 94
The rule of due diligence, however, is not applicable to an
assignor who induces the assignee to delay bringing the action ;95
nor where the assignor did not own the chose even though the as-
signee at the time knew there was another claimant to it; 96 nor
-where the name of the obligor was forged.9 Due diligence does
not iequire the assignee to sue an obligor who became bankrupt
after the assignment, but before the obligation became due.98
It is, of course understood, that the above discussion does not
apply to instruments controlled by the Kentucky Negotiable
Instruments Act.
"Hughes v. Brown, 3 Bush (66 Ky.) 660 (1868). See Restate-
inent See. 175 (b).
9 Short v. Trabue, 4 Mete. (61 Ky.) 299 (1863); Drake v. Johnson,
supra n. 39. Cf. Wood. v. Berthoud, 4 3. J. Marsh. 303 (1830).
2Mardis v. Tyler, 10 B. Mon. (49 Ky.) 376 (1850).
Sower v. Cumming, 6 Ky. Op. 216 (1872).
"Samuel v. Hall, 9 B. Mon. (48 Ky.) 374 (1849). Restatement See.
-175 (b). Coffman v. AZlin, Litt. Sel. Cas. 20 (1815), holding that the
:ssignor of a forged bond who "assigns" without recourse is not liable
to the assignor is perhaps overruled by implication.
Samuel v. Hall, supra n. 94; Cope 1. Arberry, 2 J. J. Marsh. (25
Ky.) 296 (1829).
"Emmerson. v. Claywell, 14 B. Mon. (53 Ky.) 15 (1853).
"Ware v. Mcormack, 96 Ky. 139 .(1894). Wynn v. Poynter, 3
Bush (66 Ky.) 54 (1867), contra is overruled.
"Roberts v. Atwood, 8 B. Mon. (47 Ky.) 209 (1847) ; see Parker v.
Owings, 3 A. K. Marsh, 59 (1820), Cf. Mlair v. Barr, 2 A. K. Marsh,
:255 (1820), where maker is dead when note becomes due.
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5. PARTIAL ASSIGNINT.
In harmony with the common law rule, a partial assignee
cannot sue at law in his own name. 99 Nor can he join in an
action with the partial assignor unless authorized so to do by
statute.10 0  But such partial assignees are protected in equity
so as to be preferred over subsequent garnishments,10 1 and are
fully protected -whenever the debtor consents to the assign-
ments.10 2 Such assignments bind the obligor 0 3 when all the
parties are before the court' 04 It has been held 0 5 that an order
to pay an entire claim (not assignable under the statute) was an
equitable assignment and presumably may not be withdrawn
even before the assignee has given notice to the obligor, but an
order assigning a part of such claim may be withdrawn before
acceptance by the obligor.
A distinction should be drawn between a partial assignment
and the assignment by a co-partner of his entire severable in-
interest. 106 In Elledge v. Strughn, 107 A assigned a part of a debt
due from B to C and later the residue to D. It was held that the
action against B must be brought in the name of A and not in
the name of D for the reason that the term "residue" indicated
that the assignor was transferring merely the balance of his bene-
ficial interest, but not the legal title that he held as trustee for C.
One case of partial assignment in Kentucky created a very
Columbia Finance Co. v. First National Bank, 116 Ky. 364, 76 S.
W. 156 (1903); Weinstock v. Bellwood, 12 Bush (75 Ky.) 139 (1876);
Bank v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. (45 Ky.) 599 (1846). (The partial assignor
sues as trustee for the partial assignee and a right of set-off against
the partial assignor, acquired after notice of the partial assignment,
is not available to the obligor.) A partial assignee is entitled to such
portion of the security as the fraction of the claim asigned to him
'bears to the whole. Lee Carlisle v. Juniper, 81 Ky. 282 (1883). Cf. I
Williston on Contracts, Sec. 432. Cf. PeZly v. Bowyer, 7 Bush 513
(1870); 34 Yale L. Jour. 258, 266 (1925); Restatement, Sec. 156; The
Real Party in Interest, by Professor L. M. Simes in 10 Ky. L. J. 60,
66 (1922); Gratuitous Partial Assignments by Professor E. D. Dick-
inson, 31 Yale L. J. 1 (1922).
11Hubbard v. Prather, 1 Bibb 178 (Ky. 1808).
10 Lutter v. Grosse, 82 S. W. (Ky.) 278 (1904).
1 Columbia Finance Co. v. First National Bank, supra n. 99.
1"3Lexington Brewing Co. v. Hamon, 155 Ky. 711 (1913).
1 4Kentucky Lumber and Millworlk Go. 1. Montz, 158 Ky. 328, 164
S. W. 935 (1914). Cf. Philadelphia Veneer & Lumber Co. v. Garrison,
160 Ky. 329, 169 S. W. 714 (1914), and Miler v. Malony, 3 B. Mon. (42
Ky.) 105 (1842).
10 Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v. Saylor, 214 Ky. 206, 282 S. W-
1095 (1926).
"'Philadelphia Veneer and Lumber Co. v. Garrison, supra n. 104.
10,2 B. Mon. (41 Ky.) 81 (1841).
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great hardship on the partial assignee and reached a very un-
happy result.'08s A had sold a certain house and lot to B and
had given credit for a portion of the purchase price. B insured
the premises in his own right. The house was destroyed by fire
and thereafter before payment of the loss by the insurance com-
pany B assigned out of the proceeds so much as would complete
the payment of the purchase price. The insurance company,
after notice of the partial assignment, paid the entire sum to
B, who was insolvent at the time, and who disappeared. It was
held that the partial assignee had no rights which the obligor
was bound to recognize.
Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Act our court held that
a check was an assignment, 109 and that the assignee might sue
the drawee for refusal to pay when in funds." 0 . It therefore
seems that prior to that act such a partial assignee could sue the
drawee bank in his own name."' That law does not now prevail.
6. SUCCESSIVE AND GRAZTmTOUS ASSIGNMENTS.
It is well understood that under the English rule as repre-
sented by Dearle v. Hall 112 where there are successive assign-
ments of- choses in action, the assignee who first gives notice to
the obligor prevails. The Restatement, however, follows the so-
called Anierican rule recently adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States,'- 3 and favors the prior assignee." 4
"'Henry Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Denker, 218 Ky. 68, 290 S. W. 742
(1927). For the contrary view which is declared to be the great weight
of authority, see 1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 444. The Restatement,
Sec. 156, illustration page 190, seems to suggest that the obligor with
notice should pay the whole sum into court if he does not wish to make
partial payments. For a case on all fours with the principal case and
reaching the contrary results see Todd v. Meding, 56 N. J. Eq. 83, 38
Atl. 349 (1897).
11 Taylor v. Taylor, 78 Ky. 470 (1880). Not so a bill of exchange,
Hart v. Dixon, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 669 (1884). See Boswell v. Citizens
Savings Bank, 123 Ky. 485; 1 Williston on Contracts. Sec. 425; Re-
statement, Sec. 163. Note in 14 Minn. Rev. 157 (1930).
10Lester v. Given, 8 Bush 357 (Ky. 1871). The rule was changed
under the Negotiable Instrument Law of 1904. See First Natl. Bank. v.
Hargis Cor. Bank, 170 Ky. 690 (1916).
m Cf. Buckner v. Sayre, 18 B. Mon. 745, 746 (57 Ky. 1857), where a
bill of exchange was also held to be an assignment but perhaps it was
intended to assert that the assignment was not effective until accept-
ance.
13 Russ. 1, 48 (Oh. 1928).
luSec. 173 (c).
='Cf. Criticism of this section by McDowell, "Risks of an assignee
under the Restatement of the Law of Contracts," 17 Ky. L. J. 339, 344.
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The Kentucky cases are in harmony with this rule, 115 and
of course the prior assignee prevails as to subsequent attaching
creditors.116 In Harrison v. Burgess 117 the subsequent assignee
of a conditional promise to re-deliver a chose in action was pro-
tected mainly because he was also the obligor of the chose and
had an available set-off to it. The conditional promisor who
delivered to the second assignee was not liable because no injury
had resulted from the act.
Under the Restatement a gratuitous assignment passes
title to the chose in action that is revocable"l 7 a. In Kentucky
a gratuitous assignment also passes title"17 b. It has been held
however, in Kentucky, that if there is a delivery of the instru-
ment death does not revoke the gift of notes, savings bank pass-
books; and it is also held that the delivery of a receipt given
by one who holds notes and bonds is a delivery of the latter
and is irrevocable by death. Even if the delivery of account
(books passes the title to the claims represented by them and
death does not revoke the "transfer'1c. The Restatement
declares that gifts of choses in action are irrevocable only where
there has been a delivery of some tangible token or writing, the
surrender of which is required by the obligor's contract for its
enforcement.
What authority there is in Kentucky accords with the Re-
statement respecting the effect of gratuitous assignments. One
case holds that an assignment without consideration passes the
title to the assignee and he may sue the obligor" 7 d.
n'Columbia Finance Co. v. First atl. Bank, supra n. 99; Lexington
Brewing Go. v. Hamon, infra n. 119; Carlisle v. Jumper, 81 Ky. 282(1883). See additional cases cited in Corp. Juris, "Assignments," p.
954 n. 37.
O Taylor's Exrs. v. Gibbs, 3 B. Mon. (42 Ky.) 316 (1843); Fore-
paugh v. Appod, supra n. 3; Millett v. Swift, 138 Ky. 408 (1910).
1 5 T. B. Mon. (21 Ky.) 417 (1827).
U
7
A Restatement, See. 158.
1B Henderson National Bank v. Lagow, supra n. 58.
11c Southerland v. Southerland, 5 Bush. 591 (1869); (note); Merri-
wether v. Morrison, 78 Ky. 572 (1880) (note); Turpin v. Thompson, 2
Metc. 420 (Ky. 1859) (note); Stephenson v. King, 81 Ky. 425 (1883).(receipt for notes and bonds payable to assignor); Ashbrook v. Ryon, 2
Bush 228 (1867) (holds that delivery of a commercial bank passbook
is not sufficient but agrees with the other cases as to a note). McCoy
v. McCoy, 126 Ky. 783 (1907) (delivery of savings bank passbook
-nakes an irrevocable assignment and dictum that there is no differ-
*ence as to commercial bank passbooks); Jones v. Moore, 102 Ky. 591
(1898) (account books).
"D Bank v. Lagow, supra n. 58.
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7. FoRm Op ASmG 'mENT.
The Restatement declares 1 18 that a right can be effectively
assigned either orally or in writing. Our court has held that
a prior parol partial assignment to the debtor' is sufficient as
against a subsequent entire assignment 119 and as against sub-
sequent attaching creditors.' 20 Prior oral assignment carries
with it a superior claim for the benefit of a surety who takes
the assignment for indemnification as against a subsequent gar-
nishing creditor. It follows that an assignment may be in writ-
ing and on a paper separate from the instrument assigned.' 2'
In general, any written form of assignment is sufficient
which indicates an intention to part with the right assigned.' 22
In one case the assignor purported to assign the claims which
he held against certain Germans obligated by indentures for the
performance of service. It appears that the Germans were re-
leased by the court on habeas corpus proceedings. In an action
against the assignor for the price paid by the assignee it was
held that there was no liability on the part of the former be-
cause the release was due to a faulty form of assignment used,
but this form had been insisted upon by the assignee.' 23
SuMMARY.
The Statute of 1798 making "bonds, bills, and promissory
notes whether for money or property" assignable so that the
assignee might sue on them in his own name, has undoubtedly
had much to do in retarding the free assignability of contrac-
tual rights. Since by its terms it included promissory notes, any
development toward making such note negotiable was effectually
prevented. Our court has held that many promises which could
not be regarded as "bonds, bills and promissory notes whether
m Sec. 157.
'"Lexington Brewing Co. v. Hamon, supra, n. 103. Cf. Gray v. Bris-
coe, 6 Bush (69 Ky.) 687 (1869),- and Evans v. Stratton, 142 Ky. 615,
134 S. W. 1154 (1911).
'"Vernon v. Chestnut, Ky. Law Rep. 428 (1886); Lztter v.
Grosse, supra n. 101; Fields v. Chipley, 79 Ky. 260 (1881). See also
Beard v. Sharp, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1582 (1901); Lockett v. Lockett, 26
Ky. Law Rep. 300 (1904); Little v. Berry, 113 S. W. 902 (1908).
nArmstrong v. Flora, 3 T. B. Mon. (19 Ky.) 43 (1825). Cf. Instone
v. Williams, 2 Bibb (5 Ky.) 83 (1810).
'"Forepaugh v. Appolc, supra n. 3; Cravens v. Hopson, 4 Bibb. 286(Ky. 1815); Frankfort Bank v. Hunter, 3 A. K. Marsh, 292 (1821);
Ashoraft v. Brownfllld, 7 T. B. Mon. (23 Ky.) 123 (1828).
"McKee v. Hoover, 1 T. B. Mon. (17 Ky.) 32 (1824).
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for money or property" might still be assignable in equity,
whatever that may mean. One thing it seems to have meant was
that the assignor must be a party whenever litigation on the
obligation became necessary, and the real party in interest stat-
ute did not dispense with that necessity, but rather required it.
Until 1904 there was no generally effective way of cutting off
defenses to obligations arising from promissory notes, save those
that were payable at and discounted at a bank. Equities of
ownerships however, were cut off.
Under this same statute on assignments there arose an ex-
treme liability on the part of the assignor to repay the assignee
for losses that accrued from the latter's inability to recover
from the obligor if he pursued the latter with "due diligence."
One Kentucky case at least adopts the general rule as to assign-
ments without reference to the statute.
Kentucky has in general agreed with the Restatement re-
garding rights of the partial assignee. One case holding that the
obligor with notice may at will entirely disregard the partial as-
signee, is not believed to be in harmony with the spirit of the
prior decisions and the court should not find it over difficult to
overrule that case.
Our court has consistently followed the American view as
represented in the Restatement regarding successive assignments
and has repudiated the English view. Our decisions also fall
in line as to the manner of executing assignments to the effect
that they may even be oral."
A~viN E. EvAs.
*Acknowledgment is here made of valuable suggestions made by
Judge Robert H. Winn, of Mt. Sterling, Kentucky.
